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I. INTRODUCTION
Antipersonnel (A/P) land mines are devastating weapons not only
during, but also after, warfare or armed conflicts. There still exist an
estimated 85 million mines, or one for every 50 people on earth, scattered
in 62 countries that kill and maim some 26,000 innocent civilians each
year. In Cambodia and Angola, for example, there are more than 30,000
and 20,000 amputees, respectively, who are victims of mine incidents.
These mines have impeded the return of refugees and internally displaced
persons to their homes, thus rendering vast areas of land unproductive
despite severe food shortages. The following statistics are sombering:
Mines cost as little as $3 each to produce, up to $1,000 each to remove,
and $5,000 for the treatment and rehabilitation of each survivor. But these
grim statistics do not tell the whole story. According to the United
Nations, although 100,000 mines are removed each year, between 2 and 5
million new mines are laid. Thus, the problem worsens with time.
II. COMPATIBILITY OF A/P LAND MINES WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Common Features of A/P Land mines
1. Once planted, A/P land mines are not selective in their targets;
they cannot distinguish civilians from soldiers.
2. Most of the civilians killed or injured are women and children:
vulnerable groups requiring special protection under international law.
They suffer immense bodily pain and psychological and emotional trauma.
Their loss of limbs can never be recovered. Children are often lured by
toy-like contraptions that explode on impact.
3. Mines are long-lasting unless fitted with deactivation or
self-destruct mechanisms. They continue to hurt innocent civilians long
after the ending of war or armed conflict.
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4. While originally detectable because of their metallic content,
mines can now be practically undetectable.
5. Mines are used primarily in internal armed conflicts in developing
countries, rather than in international armed conflicts.
B. The Law
The legal status of A/P land mines may be approached from
customary international law and treaties. Customary international law
forbids the use of weapons which cause unnecessary suffering and are
indiscriminate as between military and civilian objects or personnel. Also
forming part of customary international law is the principle of
proportionality, under which the use of weapons whose damaging effects
are disproportionate to their military purposes is prohibited. These rules
are legally binding on all States, whether or not they are parties to any
treaties regulating the use of such weapons.
There are many treaties renouncing or regulating the use of
specific weapons. The most recent of these is the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in Paris on January
13, 1993. Belonging to this category of treaties is the 1980 Convention on
Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects ("Convention on Conventional Weapons"), with its
Protocol II: Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps and Other Devices. On March 24, 1995, the United States
ratified the Convention, whose contents are summarized below:
- Mines may be directed only at military objectives. Indis-
criminate use is prohibited and all feasible precautions must be taken to
protect civilians.
- Remotely-delivered mines may not be used unless their location
is accurately recorded or they are fitted with an effective neutralizing
mechanism.
- Records must be kept of the location of pre-planned minefields,
and the parties to a conflict are also to keep records on other minefields
laid during hostilities.
- At the end of hostilities, the parties are to try to agree either
among themselves or with other States or organizations to take the
necessary measures to clear minefields.
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C. Applying the Law to A/P Land mines
As measured against the rules of customary and conventional
international law, A/P land mines cannot pass the test of legitimacy.
Indeed, in his address to the United Nations on September 26, 1994,
President Clinton called on all nations to join the United States for the
"eventual elimination" of A/P land mines. As a first step, he proposed the
conclusion of a multilateral "agreement to reduce the number and
availability of those mines."
The United States had in fact worked toward that goal. Thus, in
late 1992, the United States adopted a unilateral, one-year moratorium on
the transfer of A/P land mines to other countries. The moratorium was
extended for three more years in 1993. In December 1993, the General
Assembly adopted unanimously a United States sponsored resolution
calling on all countries to adopt a moratorium on the export of A/P land
mines that pose a grave risk to civilians.
III. STRENGTHENING THE 1980 CONVENTION
Notwithstanding many positive elements in the 1980 Convention
and its Protocol II, their potential for reducing the casualties and damages
to the civilian population remains unfulfilled. In fact, none of the armed
conflicts since 1980 in which there has been serious misuse of land mines
has been governed by the Convention. Ways must be found both to
strengthen the contents of the Convention and to make it more widely
applicable.
Because of space constraints, emphasis will be placed on a few
major gaps or shortcomings, followed by the author's proposals for
improvement.
A. Internal Armed Conflicts
The 1980 Convention at present applies only formally to
international armed conflicts, although most of the armed conflicts today
are of internal nature. Hence, the Convention should be amended to
broaden its scope of application to include internal armed conflicts. The
amendment should draw for its support the Convention's preamble
(paragraph 5), Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,
the Fourth Geneva Convention, and the 1977 Additional Protocol II of the
Geneva Conventions. Most important, the proposed amendment should be
based on human rights. As defined by the late Sir Humphrey Waldock,
former President of the International Court of Justice, human rights are
"rights which attach to all human beings equally, whatever their
nationality," hence wherever they are. To the extent that their basic
623
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
human rights have been violated, they are entitled to protection and
assistance, whether in international or internal armed conflicts.
It should be stressed that equal rights for all individuals, be they
nationals or aliens, refugees or internally displaced persons, men, women
or children, is implied in all universal and regional human rights
instruments through the use of such expressions as "all human beings,"
"everyone," "no one," or "all." Hence, not a single "right" in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the two 1966 Covenants is
specified or implied as belonging only to those during international armed
conflicts, but not during internal armed conflicts.
B. Implementation/Enforcement Mechanism
The lack of implementation or enforcement mechanism in the 1980
Convention and Protocol II may be remedied, at least in part, by an
explicit requirement of payment of compensation to victims of A/P land
mines by those who laid the mines in violation of international law. Such
a requirement serves two useful purposes: to render justice and relief to
victims of mines, and to prevent or deter future violations through the
disincentive of compensation. Since there is no statute of limitation on the
applicability of the compensation principle, it behooves all potential
violators of international humanitarian law to observe such law. Violation
of such law, in other words, does not pay.
As a practical matter, however, the compensation remedy may not
be particularly effective if aimed at insurgent groups in developing
countries like Angola and Cambodia, unless the groups have succeeded in
overthrowing and replacing the former governments.
It should be noted that the compensation principle is an integral
part of customary international law. As early as the mid-17t century,
Grotius formulated the rule that every "fault creates the obligation to make
good the loss." The most common remedy for the breach of an
international obligation is adequate compensation. Along with the
requirements to discontinue a wrongful conduct, to provide restitution and
to guarantee non-repetition, compensation for injuries inflicted upon any
victim in violation of international law constitutes a basic concept of State
responsibility. Article 91 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949
Geneva Conventions reflects this rule of customary international law by
providing: "A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the
Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons
forming part of its armed forces."
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Similar provisions are found in Article 3 of the Hague Convention
IV of 1907 concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Statute
2277, to which the United States is a party. Both the International Court
of Justice,' and the Security Council' reaffirm the compensation principle.
C. Obligation to Record and Report the Location of Mines
Article 7(1)(a) of Protocol II of the 1980 Convention imposes an
obligation on the parties to an international armed conflict to record the
location of all "pre-planned minefields" laid by them. However, there is
no definition of what is meant by "pre-planned." Article 7(2) merely
requires the parties to "endeavor to ensure the recording of other
minefields, mines and booby-traps which they laid or placed in position."
The word "endeavor" is too weak or imprecise for enforcement purposes.
It should be noted that the obligation to record and report the
location of sea mines by the parties that laid them exists under customary
international law. Thus, in the Corfu Channel Case,3 the International
Court of Justice placed Albania's liability to Great Britain for failing to
notify British ships about mines in the Albanian waters of the Corfu
Channel, which exploded and damaged the ships, on "certain general and
well-recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of
humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war; the freedom of
maritime communication; and every State's obligation not to allow
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States." In view of the analogy between land and sea mines in their
destructive impact on personnel and material, legal principles applicable to
one type of mines should, in general, be applicable to the other.
While the United States did not participate in or accept the
conclusion of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,4 the
decision of the Court remains relevant. In that case, Nicaragua alleged
that a total of twelve vessels or fishing boats were destroyed or damaged
by mines in Nicaraguan internal waters or territorial sea, and that fourteen
people were wounded and two killed. These were reportedly small mines
laid on the sea-bed and triggered either by contact, acoustically,
magnetically or by water pressure. They caused noisy explosions, but
were unlikely to sink a ship. The Court decided, by a vote of fourteen
1. See, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 149.
2. Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991.
3. IC. Reports 1949, pp. 4, 22.
4. Nicaragua v. United States of America, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.
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(including that of Judge Schwebel) to one, "that the United States of
America, by failing to make known the existence and location of the mines
laid by it. . . has acted in breach of its obligation under customary
international law in this respect. "
In reaching this decision, the Court cited, inter alia, the
Convention relative to the laying of automatic submarine contact mines of
1907,6 which provides that, even in time of war, "every possible
precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping," and
belligerents are bound to notify the danger zones as soon as military
exigencies permit, by a notice addressed to ship owners, which must also
be communicated to the Governments through the diplomatic channel.7
In response to a request from Libya that Germany assist it in
removing mines laid by General Rommel's Army during World War II,
Germany sent Libya a huge stack of maps detailing the locations of such
mines. In addition, Germany sent several de-mining teams to Libya to
help locate and remove the mines, with all expenses paid by Germany on
an ex qratia basis. The then German Charge d'Affaires to Libya, Dr. G.
Muller-Chorus, termed the obligation to render such assistance as required
under Volkerrecht im Entstehen.
D. Obligation to Remove Mines
Article 9 of Protocol II of the 1980 Convention concerns
international cooperation in the removal of minefields, mines and
booby-traps. Again, the imprecise word, "endeavor," is used with regard
to the reaching of agreement on such cooperation. No clear legal
responsibility is assigned to anyone for mine clearance.
It is submitted that the primary responsibility for mine removal
rests with the parties that laid the mines. This not only conforms with the
concept of State responsibility, but also is practical since the parties which
laid the mines are in the best position to know their location and the armed
units directly involved. Imposing a clear responsibility on these parties to
remove mines would also have a deterrent effect. Such responsibility is
implied in Article 7 obligating the parties immediately after the cessation
of active hostilities to use the mine-location records "to protect civilians
from the effects of minefields, mines and booby-traps." Such protection
surely includes, at the minimum, mine removal.
5. pp. 147-48.
6. Hague Convention No. VIII.
7. Art. 3 p. 12.
8. Personal interview with Dr. Muller-Chorus in Washington, D.C., June 16 1995.
626 [Vol. 2:621
1996] Lee 627
IV. CONCLUSIONS
As noted earlier, President Clinton has called for the eventual
elimination of antipersonnel land mines by all nations. Characterizing
these mines as "an enduring threat to post-war reconstruction around the
world," Secretary of State Warren Christopher has urged "a multi-faceted
approach to addressing the problems caused by this most deadly debris of
war." Not only the use, but also the production, stockpiling and transfer of
these mines should be prohibited.
The review conferences of the 1980 Convention on Conventional
Weapons scheduled for January and April 1996 should be occasions for
intense preparation for the eventual elimination of A/P land mines.
Pending their elimination, the Convention should be strengthened along the
lines suggested in this paper, and its widest possible adherence by States be
promoted.
